Complementarities and systems: Understanding japanese economic organization by Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John
COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS: 





Resumen: El comportamiento de la economía japonesa en 
los últimos cuarenta y cinco años es un caso sin 
precedente en la historia de la humanidad, al 
pasar del colapso inminente de la posguerra a 
ser una de las más ricas y productivas del mundo. 
El propósito del presente trabajo es interpre-
tar, tanto los rasgos característicos de la 
organización económica de Japón en términos de 
complementariedad, como algunos desarrollos re-
cientes de su economía. Esto último nos permitirá 
especular con respecto al futuro de la misma. 
Abstract: The performance of the Japanese economy in 
the last forty-five years, during which it has gone 
from post-war destitution and near collapse to one 
of the richest and most productive in the world 
is unmatched in human history. The purposes of 
this essay are to interpret both the characteristic 
features of Japanese economic organization in 
terms of the concept of complementarity, and 
some recent developments in Japanese 
economy, and to speculate on its future. 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented by the second-named author at 
the XII Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society in Tucuman, Argentina, 
in a lecture sponsored by Estudios Económicos. We are indebted to our colleague, 
Masahiko Aoh, for his careful and perceptive comments on an earlier draft. The 
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The performance of the Japanese economy in the last forty-five years, 
during which it has gone from post-war destitution and near collapse 
to one of the richest and most productive in the world, is unmatched 
in human history. Between 1950 and 1990, real GNP per capita 
increased from $1 230 to $23 970 (both calculated in 1990 prices), 
rising from one-eighth of the level in the United States to surpass it. 
Since the War, life expectancies have increased by half, from 50 years 
for males to 75, and from 54 to 81 years for females.
1 Naturally, 
Japan's experience has attracted much attention among those con-
cerned with economic growth: How did Japan do it? Can other 
nations replicate the Japanese success? What are the key lessons from 
Japan for countries seeking economic growth? 
A unique set of institutional arrangements, organizational struc-
tures and managerial practices are characteristic of Japanese 
economic organization, and many observers have seen various of 
these as important causal elements in Japan's economic success. They 
have consequently advocated imitating these features elsewhere, both 
in the practices of individual firms and at an economy-wide level. 
Very often, however, attempts to import elements of Japanese prac-
tice to other countries have been partial or complete failures. 
Our first purpose in this essay is to interpret the characteristic 
features of Japanese economic organization in terms of the concept 
of complementarity. We will argue that these features together con-
stitute a system of complementary elements, each of which fits with 
the others and makes the others more effective than they would 
otherwise be. Further, this system has been particularly well adapted to 
the demographic, social, macroeconomic, legal, political and regulatory 
environment in which Japanese business has operated since World 
War II.
2 The result is a coherent whole that is much greater than the 
sum of the individual parts. 
Consequently, the individual features and their contribution to 
the success of the Japanese economy cannot be properly understood 
financial support of El Colegio de México and the National Science Foundation of the 
United States is gratefully acknowledged. 
1 The data in the preceding two sentences are drawn from Clive Crook (1993). 
2 The roots of the system lie partly in the wartime planned economy of Japan, as 
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by examining them one at a time, in isolation from the other 
complementary elements of the system or the environmental con-
text in which the system has been embedded. Moreover, this 
analysis suggests that copying individual elements of Japanese 
practice and transplanting them piecemeal into other countries' 
systems, where the complementary elements are absent, cannot be 
expected to yield the sort of results experienced in Japan, because 
the positive interaction effects that the elements of the Japanese 
system exert on one another will be missed. Instead of a coherent 
pattern of mutually supporting elements, the result of organiza-
tional "mix-and-match" is an ill-adapted misfit. This helps explain 
the limited success that attempts to adopt particular aspects of 
Japanese practice in isolation have often met. At the same time, it 
is consistent with the fact that there have been notable instances 
where adopting many of the features more-or-less simultaneously 
has met with real success. 
The second purpose of this essay is to use this framework to 
interpret some recent developments in the Japanese economy and 
to speculate on its future. Many of the features of the environment in 
which Japanese business has operated are now changing in ways that 
worsen the fit between the environment and the organizational 
structure. At the same time, in the early 1990s Japan has experienced 
the longest and most severe recession in its recent history. The 
environmental changes threaten the viability of particular elements 
of the organizational system. But, given that these elements must 
change or be replaced, the coherence of the whole system is 
threatened: It may not be possible to change only a few elements of the 
system and maintain its performance without also changing the other 
aspects that were dependent on these. Thus, the Japanese arguably 
need to make much more far-reaching, systemic changes in their 
economy than an analysis that ignores the complementarities would 
suggest. The weak performance of the Japanese economy over the last 
several years may then be both a reflection of the worsening fit 
between the organizational structure and the environment and a spur 
to more rapid adaptation. 
This essay is interpretive. In particular, we will not present a 
formal, mathematical model of Japanese economic organization. 
Nonetheless, precise mathematical concepts underlie our analysis. 6 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
We review some of the basic elements of the mathematical theory of 
systems of complements that are most relevant for the present pur-
pose in the first section of this essay. In the second section we describe 
the characteristic features of the Japanese system and explore the 
sources of complementarity among them and their fit with the en-
vironment in which they have been embedded. The final section 
explores the changes that are occurring in the environment and 
considers the need for and implications of organizational adaptation. 
1. Complementarity 
The most common notion of complementarity is that from standard 
price theory, where, for example, two inputs are complements if 
raising the once of one of them lowers the use of the other. Here we 
adopt a broader conception (due to Edgeworth) that is not dependent 
on the special structure of prices and quantities and that permits 
analysis of such complex phenomena as organizational structures and 
government, policies. 
Specifically, we say that a group of activities are (Edgeworth) 
complements if doing more of any subset of them increases the 
returns to doing more of any subset of the remaining activities. In a 
differentiable framework, this idea corresponds to positive mixed-
partial derivatives of some payoff function: The marginal returns to 
one variable are increasing in the levels of the other variables. How-
ever, for many of the problems one wants to address, it is unnatural 
or extremely restrictive to assume even divisibility of choice variables, 
let alone smoothness of objective functions. Fortunately, however, 
those conditions are also unnecessary for analyzing systems of com-
plements. Looking at the informal definition above, we see that 
Edgeworth complementarity is a matter of order- "doing more of one 
thing increases the returns to doing more of another". 
Formally, consideration of choices from sets of objects that are 
(partially) ordered leads into the branch of mathematics known as 
lattice theory. The analysis of complementarity then becomes the 
study of so-called supermodular functions on lattices. We will actually 
need very litlle of this formal structure to exposit the key results of 
this area that are useful for analyzing the questions of complemen-COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS 7 
tarity and systems that arise in the study of Japanese economic 
organization, but some minimal terminology is useful. 
First, a lattice is just a set X whose elements are (partially) ordered 
and that has the property that, for any two points x and yinX.X also 
contains a smallest element under the order that is larger than both 
x and y and a largest element that is smaller than both. We write 
xv y (read "x join /') to denote the smallest element larger than both x 
and y, and x A y (read "x meet y") to denote the largest element that is 
smaller than both x and y. 
Any subset of the real numbers with their natural ordering forms 
a lattice. A different lattice is obtained by taking the real numbers but 
reversing the usual order. For a richer example, consider the N-
dimensional Euclidean space together with the familiar com-
ponent-wise, product (partial) order, denoted >^ and given by 
x >Ny if and only if xn > yn, n = 1, . . . , N, where > is the usual order 
on the real numbers. This is a lattice, and the meet and join opera-
tions are given by the component-wise min and max: 
x A y = (mini*!, yi}, min{xN, yN}) 
and 
x v y = (maxixj, yj,..., max{^, yN)), 
as in Figure 1. Clearly x A y is (weakly) smaller than either x ory, and 
it is the largest point having this property because any higher point is 
larger in at least one component than one or both of x and> Similarly, 
the component-wise maximum, x v y, is the smallest point that is 
larger than both x and y. Generally, instead of doing this construction 
with the product lattice obtained from N copies of the lattice R, 
we could have begun with any iV lattices and constructed a new lattice 
as the iV-fbld product, with the product, component-wise order. 
A quite different example is provided by starting with some 
arbitrary set Z and considering the set 2
Z of subsets of Z, with set 
inclusion defining the partial order: x < y means xcy.ln this context, 
given any two subsets x and y of Z, x A y is simply the intersection 
xny, because the intersection is contained in both sets (that is, it is 
smaller than both in this order) and it is the largest set with that 
property. Similarly, x v y is the union iu> Besides helping in remem-8 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
bering the meaning of the symbols A and v, this example illustrates 
that the elements of a lattice can be complicated objects. 
A sublattice of a lattice X is a subset S of X that is closed under the 
operations of meet and join that are defined in the original lattice, 
that is, if x and y are each in S, then so are their meet and join. Any 
lattice is a sublattice of itself. In Figure 1, the set S, the four-point set 
{x, y, x A y, x v y] and the two-point set fx A y, x v y} are all sublattices 
of and each of the sets in this list is a sublattice of the preceding 
ones. Each of the singleton sets is also (trivially) a sublattice. 
Figure 1 
The set S and the four point set {x, y, x A y, x v y} 
are both sublattices o/R
2 
The two-point set {x, y] in the figure is an example of a set that is 
not a sublattice of R
2. Formally, one verifies this by observing that the 
set does not contain either the meet or the join of x and y. From a 
modeling perspective, what this means is that starting from the 
feasible point x, one cannot increase the first component from xx to 
yx without also decreasing the second component. If we think of 
{x, y] as a constraint set, then the constraint forces the decision maker 
to choose between high values of the first and second component. COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS 9 ' 
Sublattice constraints never restrict a decision maker in that 
way: Increasing the value of some decision variables never prevents 
one from increasing the others as well, and, similarly, decreasing 
some variables never prevents decreasing others. Intuitively, sublat-
tice constraints represent a kind of technical complementarity. For 
example, a sublattice constraint could be used to model the idea 
that investing in more flexible equipment and a more broadly 
trained factory work force never prevents a firm from widening its 
product line or even that these are a necessary prerequisite for 
such a change. 
There is a second element in the formalization of complemen-
tarity that is expressed not through the constraints but through the 
objective function. Given a real-valued function/on a lattice X, we 
say that/ is supermodular and its arguments are (Edgeworth) comple-
ments if and only if for any x and y in X, 
f(x) -fix A y) <f(x v y) -f(y). 
This is simply a mathematical restatement of the verbal definition 
given earlier: The returns to increasing some of the variables are 
greater the larger are the values of the other variables. This is easy to 
see in the R
2 example. There the defining inequality says that the 
change in/going from the coordinate-wise minimum, x A y, to x (or y) 
is less than that associated with the parallel move from y (or x) to the 
maximum, x v y (see Figure 1 again): increasing one argument of 
the function has a bigger impact when the other argument is at a 
higher level. If/ is twice continuously differentiable, the condition is 
equivalent to nonnegative mixed-partial derivatives: The marginal 
returns to increasing any one argument are increasing in the level of any 
other argument. Note that complementarity is symmetric: If doing 
more of activity a raises the value of increases in activity b, then 
increasing b also raises the value of increasing a. Note too that in 
multi-dimensional problems, one can check supermodularity pair-
wise: The function/^,. .., xN) is supermodular if and only if for all 
i and i * //is supermodular when viewed as a function of only x{ 
and xj with all the other arguments held fixed. This fact facilitates 
discussing complementarities, because one does not have to deal with 
all the variables simultaneously. 10 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Any function of a single real variable is trivially supermodular. 
The Cobb-Douglas function f(x, y, z) = ax
ayh
y is supermodular if a is 
positive and all of the exponents are of the same sign. If gis concave, 
then f(x,y)=g(x-y) is supermodular, and if g is convex, then 
f{x,y)=g(x + y) is supermodular. In each case these results can be 
checked by calculating mixed partial derivatives if differentiability is 
assumed, but they continue to be true without any smoothness as-
sumptions and even when the domains of the functions are restricted 
to sublattices of Euclidean space, such as the integer points. 
The theories of optimization of supermodular functions and of 
non-cooperative games in which the payoff functions are super-
modular originated in the 1960s in the unpublished work of Donald 
Tophs and Arthur Veinott. The first published results are those 
of Tophs (1978, 1979). Extensions of the theories and applications in 
economics and management have proliferated recently: See, for ex-
ample, Bagwell and Ramey (1993), Gates, Milgrom and Roberts 
(1995), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1993), Meyer, Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992), Meyer and Mookherjee (1987), Milgrom (1994), 
Milgrom, Qian and Roberts (1991), Milgrom and Roberts (1988,1990a, 
1990b, 1991, 1994a, 1994b), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Shannon 
(1990, 1992), Topkis (1987, 1994) and Vives (1990). A brief, very 
informal survey of some of the key properties and results will suggest 
some of the reasons for this interest (see the above references for the 
missing details and for applications). 
First, supermodularity very nicely captures the important con-
cept of complementarity. Further, it provides a way to formalize 
the intuitive ideas of synergies and systems effects -the idea that 
"the whole is more than the sum of its parts". To see this in a simple 
context, let x and y be any two points in R" with x strictly larger than 
y. Supermodularity is mathematically equivalent to the statement that 
for every such x and y, the gain from increasing every component 





Moreover, the implications of supermodularity described below do 
not depend on the usual kinds of "standard" assumptions that COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS  11 
economists often make but that seem so implausible in many con-
texts, including the study of economic systems. For example, we do 
not need any divisibility or concavity assumptions, so increasing 
returns are easily encompassed. (Indeed, the existence of strong and 
widespread complementarities among sufficiently many choice vari-
ables will itself imply that the objective cannot be concave.) 
Further, because the theory concerns functions on arbitrary 
lattices, choices might be over such -messy- things as business 
strategies and organizational policies, provided we can order each of 
them in some useful way. In this regard, it is often useful to consider 
product lattices in which particular dimensions of choice involve just 
two points. Frequently, when we do this, it is straightforward to order 
the two points in a way consistent with supermodularity of the 
objective function. In doing so, however, one needs to be concerned 
that important alternatives are not being ignored whose inclusion 
might invalidate the analysis. 
Because the theory does not require concavity of the objective 
function or convexity of the constraint sets, it encompasses situations 
where some choice y is a local maximum but not a global maximum, 
that is, where no adjustments of the choice y in some neighbor-
hood are worthwhile and yet there are more distance points that 
yield distinctly higher payoffs. Moreover, the theory can also encom-
pass situations where each of the terms on the right-hand side of the 
last inequality is negative -meaning that changes in the individual 
components are not worthwhile- and yet the left-hand side is positive 
-so that changes in all the components together are profitable. 
This last point is the basis for an interpretation of the failure of 
piece-meal adoption of organizational innovations in terms of com-
plementarities: If the several elements of organizational structure are 
complementary determinants of performance, then there may be 
multiple patterns of organization which are coherent in that each 
(proper subset of) choice variable(s) is optimally chosen, given the 
specified values of the other variables, and yet which need not yield 
equivalent performance. Further, adopting only some of the features 
of the betterperforming pattern may actually worsen performance. 
Thus, in particular, adopting only some of the features of a successful 
economic system while adhering to other elements from another 
coherent system may be disastrous. 12 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
The mathematics also suggests why change may be difficult to 
achieve in such systems, even when all the dimensions on which 
change must occur are understood. Even if a coordinated adjustment 
on all the relevant dimensions might yield an improvement in perfor-
mance, it may be that until all the features of the new pattern have 
been implemented, the performance of the system may be much 
worse than in the original position. Because simultaneous, coor-
dinated change on many dimensions may be difficult, any attempt at 
reform must actually be piece-meal, and so may initially result in 
worsened performance. This in turn may lead to reconsideration of 
the planned change and its abandonment. 
The second key set of properties of systems of complements 
relate to comparative statics. If the domain of a supermodular func-
tion f{x, G) is a sublattice consisting of vectors of choice variables x 
and vectors of parameters 6, then the comparative statics on the 
maximizers are unambiguous: (Some selection from) the maximizers 
x*(0) will be monotone nondecreasing in the parameters 0. In par-
ticular, the choice variables tend to move up or down together in a 
systematic, coherent fashion in response to environmental changes, 
and a change that favors increasing any one variable leads to increases 
in all the variables. Moreover, the magnitude of the change in any 
component, say Xj, as 0 changes and the other components adjust 
optimallv is larger than the change that would be made if the other 
components remained fixed. 
The logic here is simple. Any change in the parameter that leads 
to an increase in any one variable will raise the returns to increasing 
each of the other variables. But the resulting increase in each of the 
variables then increases again the gain from increasing each of the others. 
Thus, the effects are all mutually re-enforcing, and the initial change 
is subject to a multiplier effect -a conclusion that we shall later argue is 
highly relevant for forecasting the likely future of the Japanese 
economy. 
Third, if the payoff can be written as/^,. .., xn) + X/) 
for some n disjoint sets of variables /' and iff is supermodular, then 
so too is the function f{xv ..., xn = Sup f(xlt ...,xn) + Xg'C*,-. f) 
obtained by maximizing out the f variables. Note that while each f is 
allowed to interact with only one of the components of the vector x, 
there are no restrictions in this formulation on the nature of the COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS  13 
variables y
i -they need not be vectors or numbers or ordered vari-
ables- nor are they required to be complementary with one another 
or with the core choice variables in x. This result allows the theory 
to be extended to situations where the overall objective function is 
not supermodular, perhaps because some of the choice variables 
are substitutes for one another. So long as the objective can be 
divided up among a set of complementary effects that extend 
across subunits through the strategic choice variables x and other 
effects that enter only through the local variables y, the conclusions 
about complementary choices and their comparative statics are 
unaffected. 
Combining these last two observations suggests that a firm adapt-
ing to environmental change will be most likely to find profitable 
new activities in areas that are complementary to the newly increased 
activities. For example, suppose the / variables are non-negative real 
numbers and that f = 0 initially before a parameter change that 
increases the optimal value of x\ Then, at the new optimum after the 
parameter change, / is still zero if d^/dx{ df < 0,
3 but / can be 
positive if the reverse inequality holds. Even if the initial position was 
not an optimum, if the chosen level of x' increases and the cross-par-
tial with / is positive, then increasing y
l is now more attractive. Thus, 
the search for complementary new activities can help direct the 
activities of boundedly rational firms in a changing environment, and 
we might expect that as systems evolve, they do so by adding features 
that are complementary with existing elements. Thus, complemen-
tarity can be the basis of models of path dependence. 
Fourth, the expected value of a supermodular function in which 
the choice variables are perturbed by random errors is higher when 
the perturbations are the same than when they are independent 
random variables. That is, ifEj, .. ., en are independent and identical-
ly distributed, then 
E [f(x1 + ev...,xn + £„)] < E [/(*! + e1,...,xn + ex)]. 
3 This holds because the objective function with x and y as arguments is 
supermodular, so the optimal value oty is a nonincreasing function of*. 14 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
In this mathematical sense, when complementarities are present, "fit" 
is important, that is, even mistaken variations from a plan are on 
average less costly when they are coordinated than when they are 
made independently. 
Fifth, in a dynamic setting, an upward or downward movement of 
a whole system of complementary variables, once begun, tends 
to continue. This applies equally to the emergence and growth and to 
the decline and collapse of systems of complements. As one formaliza-
tion of this idea, suppose that for each date t, xt maximizes 
/(*t>*t_l) subject to xte S, where xt_l is fixed by history. If / is. 
supermodular, 5 is a sublattice, and xt>x(_1 for some date t, then the 
conclusion is that xt<xt + 1<... Similarly, if the values of x ever-
decrease, they will continue to do so ever after (until disturbed by some 
shock.) The same implications remain true when the choices after 
some date t are made non-myopically to maximize ^''/{x,, xs_ x) 
starting from any xt_ x. s>t 
Many of the popular growth models based on returns to scale can 
be fit into the foregoing framework, because returns to scale in those 
models is equivalent to complementarity of choices at different points 
in time. For example, suppose the payoff earned by a decision maker in 
period t is a convex function of the stock of capital at that time, which 
in turn depends on periodic investments. For example, the net 
benefit might be B(jjf-%) - C(It), where B is convex. Then this 
s <t 
objective is supermodular in the investment levels {/,}: Returns to 
scale in this sense imply that complementarity among investments at 
different points in time_Similarly, suppose the net capital stock 
at any date is Kt = p K0 + *IS
 and the net benefit at any date is 
ptKt-ItC/Jt/Kt_{) where'each Ct is increasing and convex and 
Kq > 0. The function CT describes the average cost of investment; its 
argument is the rate of expansion of the capital stock Then invest¬
ments at different points in bme are mutually complementary, so 
higher early investments increase the pace of later investments. The 
benefits of non-myopic investment planning in such models are much 
the same as the benefits from coordination in any other situation with 
extensive complementarities. 
The next set of results concern supermodular games. These are 
finite —or infinite— strategy non-cooperative games in which (1) the COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS 15 
strategy sets are compact sublattices (2), each player's payoff function 
is supermodular in the player's own strategy choice variables and (3) 
each player's marginal returns are nondecreasing functions of the 
competitors' strategy choices. These games exhibit "strategic com-
plementarities" in the terminology of Bulow, Geanakoplos and 
Klemperer (1985): If some players increase their strategic choices, 
then the optimal choices of the other players increase too -reaction 
curves are upward-sloping. 
In such games, there exist largest and smallest pure strategy Nash 
equilibria, so that all the Nash equilibria lie in the multi-dimensional 
interval between these two. Moreover, these extremal Nash equilibria 
coincide with the largest and smallest serially undominated strategy 
profiles.
4 Thus, the interval of strategy profiles between them con-
tains all the strategies played in any common noncooperative solution 
concept, and every process of adaptive learning leads eventually to 
the exclusive play of strategies in that interval. Thus, even if one 
questions the relevance of Nash equilibria as a prediction about 
behavior in complicated games, there are good reasons to expect 
that behavior will yield something in the interval defined by the 
largest and smallest equilibria of a supermodular game. 
Supermodular games also have attractive comparative statics. If 
the player's marginal returns are nondecreasing functions of a 
parameter, then the largest and smallest equilibrium profiles are 
nondecreasing vector functions of that parameter. Consequently, the 
set containing the predicted behavior moves up with the parameter. 
Moving to a framework of bounded rationality or learning, there is 
an analog to the momentum result: If the evolution of play in a 
(repeated) supermodular game is described by each player's choice 
for any period t being the maximizing choice
5 against the others' 
choices at t - 1, and if the resulting vector of strategies increases from 
one period to the next, then in every succeeding period the strategy 
vector will again move up (at least weakly). 
4 Serially undominated strategies are strategies that survive a process of iterated 
elimination of pure strategies that are strictly dominated by some other pure strategy. 
5 If there are multiple optima, an appropriate selection must be made. For 
example, it suffices always to select the smallest (or largest) maximizer. 16 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
Increasing returns to scale is a source of strategic complemen-
tarity in games. Diamond's (1982) macroeconomic search model and 
the network externality models of Farrell and Saloner (1986) and Katz 
and Shapiro (1986) provide good illustrations. In these models, the 
payoff of an individual player j has the form/X^X) - C(xj) where/ is 
convex or- C(Xj) where/ is increasing. These conditions are 
usually interpreted as reflecting returns to scale in matching processes, 
telephone systems, shared technologies, and the like. The key 
implication is that the mixed partial derivative of the player ; s 
payoff function with respect to Xj and any other Xj is positive. 
Moreover, complementarity -rather than general returns to scale-
provides a better descriptive account in such applications. For 
example, the gains to personal computer users from focusing on 
just one or two standards is that doing so eases the development of 
complementary products including both software (operating sys-
tems, applications software) and hardware (fax boards, monitors, 
storage devices). 
Finally, the equilibria of some supermodular games have clear 
and strong welfare properties. If each player's payoff is increasing 
(decreasing) in the choice variables of the other players, then the 
largest (smallest) equilibrium is Pareto preferred to any lower 
(higher) combination of strategies, including any other equilibria. 
However, if the payoff functions are differentiable, an increase 
(decrease) in all players' strategies from this equilibrium would 
generally be Pareto-improving. It is also true that in such games, 
there is no possibility of a subgroup of players' successfully deviat-
ing as a group from the Pareto preferred equilibrium. This can be 
formalized as follows. Consider any set of players M and any Nash 
equilibrium of the induced game where these players select their 
strategies given that the players not in M adhere to the strategies 
given by the Pareto best (that is, the largest or smallest) Nash 
equilibrium. Then the original Nash equilibrium is Pareto-preferred 
for the members of M to any other equilibrium in the induced 
game. The same conclusion holds even if the individual payoffs are 
not monotone in the other players' strategies so long as the game has 
a unique equilibrium. COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS 17 
2. Japanese Economic Organization
6 
Table 1 lists many of the distinctive features of the Japanese pattern 
of economic organization, as well as some key characteristics of the 
post-War economic environment in which this system has developed 
and flourished. Examining these from the perspective of complemen-
tarity reveals important interactions and systems effects. 
Table 1 
Characteristic Features of Japanese Management 
Human Resource Policies 
Permanent employment guarantees 
Recruiting only at the bottom 
Extensive training-general and specific 
Pay for skills 
Firm-wide group bonuses 
Seniority-based promotions 
Flexible work rules 
Limited pay differentials 
Absence of stock-based executive incentives 
Frequent transfers 
High status of the Personnel Department 
Early mandatory retirement 
Governance and Ownership 
Consensus decision making 
Firms run for the employees 
Insider Boards of Directors 
High debt-equity ratios 
Mochiai (Cross-holdings of stock) 
Main-bank relations 
6 Parts of this analysis first appeared in Milgrom and Roberts (1992). For richer 
descriptions of the characteristic features of Japanese organization, see Aoki (1988) 




"Modern" manufacturing strategy flexible 
equipment and workers frequent product 
improvements broad product lines increasing 
quality decreasing cost and price low inven-
tories 




Growth and market share orientation 
Reinvestment of earnings 
Low dividends 
Long-term relations with suppliers and customers 
Keiretsu 
External/Social/Governmental 
High savings rate 
Low cost of capital 
Pro-business attitudes and policies 
Social commitment to growth 
Rapid national economic growth 
Openness of world markets 
Closed domestic markets 
Flexible, competitive smaller firms  
As stated earlier, we are not offering a formal model in which 
these features represent particular values for choice variables and 
parameters that together constitute the arguments of a supermodular 
objetive function or of the payoff functions in a supermodular game. 
Still, when we argue that two features are complementary, we will 
mean precisely that doing (more of) one increases the returns to 
doing (more of) the other. 
One way to evaluate complementarities in the Japanese economy 
involves conceiving of it a supermodular game, where the players are in-
dividual consumers, workers and firms. In this case, some of the 
complementarities are strategic: One player's undertaking some ac-COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS  19 
tivity increases the returns to some activity (perhaps the same one) 
for other players. Nevertheless, we will for the most part attempt to 
interpret the good past performance of the Japanese economy as 
emerging from coherent practices in an environment rife with com-
plementarities. That simplifies our exposition by allowing us to avoid 
issues of how the diverse decision makers are led to pursue coherent 
policies and focuses instead on why the policies are coherent. Thus, 
we will usually describe complementarities as if the economy shared 
a single objective of producing value, with occasional remarks where 
the concept of strategic complementarity would apply under the 
game interpretation. 
Much of our discussion focuses on practices of the largest firms 
in Japan. These companies are not generally representative of all of 
Japanese business. Indeed, the practices of small and medium-sized 
firms that are responsible for the bulk of Japanese GNP are quite 
different in many regards. Nevertheless, the large firms play a special, 
central role in Japanese economy and in Japanese life. 
Two policies have been most frequently noted in discussions of 
the human resource practices in major Japanese firms: Long-term 
employment guarantees for so-called permanent employees/ and 
recruiting of permanent employees only at the very early stages of 
their careers. 
These two features are not uniquely Japanese, nor are they 
followed universally by all major Japanese firms. Nor are they par-
ticularly common in small and medium-sized businesses in Japan. 
They do, however^ appear to be carried further in major Japanese 
firms than elsewhere. At least since the early 1950s, it has been 
extremely rare for a major Japanese firm to dismiss a permanent 
employee except for specific cause, let alone to institute a mass layoff. 
7 Some large Japanese firms have made use of workers to whom no long-term 
employment promise was made. In many cases, however, these "contract workers" have 
been kept on by the firms in question for long periods. Married women whose children 
were in school and who had returned to the workplace have often been employed on 
this basis. (Until quite recendy, younger women who joined large firms after high school 
or university were expected to leave at an early age to marry and raise children, and 
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This has been true both for white-collar and blue-collar workers, and 
both groups have long expected to enjoy employment security unless 
their employer was faced by imminent failure. Even when major firms 
have closed, they have often found their employees other jobs with 
related firms (see Sheard, 1992). As we vill discuss below, the employ-
ment guarantee has not been open ended -it does not extend 
through to normal retirement age, and so the frequently used ter-
minology of "life-time employment" is inappropriate in this regard-
but it has been real. 
It has been similarly rare for a major firm to hire someone at 
other than one of the lowest entry levels. These firms recruit directly 
from high school and the top universities, and all the new employees 
of a given year's cohort start work together on April first of that year. 
There is some mobility of employees in the first year or so, when 
obvious mismatches are corrected, but after that there is little or no 
hiring from outside. 
One effect of these policies has been to reduce turnover among 
permanent employees of large firms. A widespread policy of hiring only 
at the bottom means that there are unlikely to be many attractive job 
opportunities in other major firms for experienced, mid-career 
workers. Meanwhile, smaller firms do not usually offer as attractive 
compensation as large ones. They also give fewer advancement op-
portunities, have less job security, and are less prestigious places to 
work.
8 This limiting of the opportunities for moving from major 
firms both makes retention easier and simultaneously reduces the 
costs that employees would otherwise incur in monitoring the market 
for better opportunities. However, such a system would load excessive 
risk on employees if they did not have job security: Being let go would 
not just mean losing this particular job, but also being very unlikely 
ever to find a comparable new one. To the extent that this would 
represent an inefficient pattern of risk-bearing or would result in 
inefficient consumption-savings decisions, it should be avoided. The 
permanent-employment policy mitigates this risk, and so it supports 
8 Aoki (1994) has accentuated the importance of the hierarchical ranking of firms, 
relating it to the ranking hierarchy within firms (see below) and arguing that they are 
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the hiring policy, making it more valuable than it would otherwise be: 
The two are complementary.
9 
Of course, there may be other mechanisms through which having 
limited ports of entry to employment in the major firms and their 
offering permanent employment guarantees support one another. 
For example, if major firms frequently hired mid career people away 
from other firms, then any single firm offering permanent employ-
ment would face an adverse selection problem: The best employees 
would face active outside markets and would have to be treated as well 
by the firm as they would be in their next-best opportunity (or else 
they would leave), while those with Utile appeal to the outside market 
would stay on in the safety of the firm. At a minimum this would be 
inconsistent with the narrow pay differentials that mark Japanese 
compensation, and it might even render the permanent employment 
policy infeasible. Another possibility is that the lack of comparably 
attractive outside opportunities creates incentives for employees 
to care deeply about future of their firm and to work to help it 
survive and prosper. These incentives would be reduced if employees 
could easily move to another job if the firm got in trouble, and this 
would make it more difficult to maintain a credible promise of 
permanent employment. 
As well, a major firm that released employees while other firms 
were offering permanent employment would not be able find com-
parably experienced workers to replace those it released except, 
perhaps, at much higher rates of pay. Thus, large numbers of firms' 
adopting these employment practices makes their adoption more 
attractive to the remaining firms -there is a strategic complemen-
tarity here. 
The limited opportunities for Japanese permanent employees to 
move to comparable jobs with other major employers mean that 
much of their incomes are appropriable quasirents: Large amounts 
could be taken away at any time without pushing their pay below the 
levels available in their next-best alternatives and thereby inducing 
wholesale resignations. This possibility for ex post opportunism could 
'•' Viewing the economic system in game-theoretic terms, this is an instance of 
strategic complementarity: Other firms' not hiring mid-career people increases the 
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present a constant temptation in a firm that was run primarily in the 
interests of investors. Presumably, concerns with the long run 
response that such behavior might elicit would be a check on the 
temptation to seize employees' rents. Nevertheless, the temptation 
might become overwhelming in periods of low profits, when investors 
are less concerned with the long term and the reputation of the firm 
and more concerned with current returns. The employees' fear of this 
potential opportunism would then make them leery about commit-
ting to a major firm in the first place. It might also make them 
unwilling to invest in firm-specific human capital that was uniquely 
valuable to the large firm employing them, because they would have 
no way to protect their returns from these investments, which are not 
valued by other potential employers. The governance and ownership 
structure of Japanese firms, which gives considerable power to the 
employees as a group, enables them to protect their valuable employ-
ment rights and thus supports their developing and committing their 
human capital. 
In fact, in many ways it appears that the employees are "owners" 
of the Japanese firm at least on a par with the financial investors in 
the firm. Ownership of a firm has often been seen as having two 
aspects: Holding power over key decisions (such as the decision to 
liquidate the firm's assets or to appoint its top managers) that are not 
allocated elsewhere by contract, and being the residual claimant on 
the returns from the asset. Both of these adhere to the employees of 
major Japanese firms. 
Surveys of senior executives in major Japanese firms indicate that 
they regard the interests of employees as being as worthy of con-
sideration in the formulation and execution of strategy and tactics as 
those of shareholders. They also believe that employees' interests 
actually do guide policy to a very important degree (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). Middle management shares these views. Thus, both 
senior and middle managers believe the interests of the employees 
ought to weigh heavily in decisions about how the firm is run, and 
they assert that they do in fact run their firms in this fashion. 
The formal governance structure supports this orientation. The 
majority of the directors of a typical major U.S. firm are not 
employees. They are "independent" outsiders, elected by the stock-
holders. Outside directors also make up a large fraction of the board COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS 23 
in firms based in the United Kingdom, and in Germany half the 
supervisory board that oversees management are direct repre-
sentatives of investors. In the typical major Japanese corporation, in 
contrast, outside directors have almost no role, because the board of 
directors is made up almost exclusively of the thirty to forty most 
senior managers of the firm. Their nominal duty as directors is to the 
shareholders who legally elect them as their representatives and 
entrust them with overseeing top management (the representative 
directors). How effective such a large group of employees could ever 
be in disciplining top management is certainly open to some question. 
More to the point, a board consisting of employees who have spent 
their whole careers in the organization and whose social relations are 
with the other employees in the firm is certainly unlikely to give 
primacy to the shareholders' interests when these are in conflict with 
those of the employees. 
Moreover, the method in which Japanese firms have been financed 
supports this. Relatively little of the typical large firm's financing 
comes from voting equity, and only a small fraction -between a 
quarter and third- of this equity is held directly by investors. Instead, 
most of the common stock in the typical large Japanese firm is held by 




 These in turn have similar governance struc-
tures and similar managerial attitudes concerning the appropriate 
way to run firms. They also often have long-term business relations 
with the original firm, which may in turn hold significant fractions of 
their stock. This ownership pattern (called mochiai) supports manag-
ing the firm in the employees' interests, or at least giving considera-
tion to their interests over those of stockholders, because most of the 
voting shares are effectively in the hands of managers who themselves 
accept the desirability of this practice. Consequently, any pressure 
that investors might try to exert to affect firm behavior will be muted. 
Traditionally, the rest of the firm's financing has been from bank 
loans, often with one "main bank" playing a central, long-term role 
both as a lead source of financing, as a monitor, and as an ultimate 
1
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 While these cross-holdings of stock are perhaps most familiar in the case of 
member firms in keiretsu groups, they extend beyond keiretsu boundaries and exist 
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risk-bearer in circumstances of financial distress. These banks have 
similar ownership and management structures to the industrial firms. 
They have also operated under governmental regulations that limited 
price competition for funds and that encouraged them to focus 
on the size of their asset bases rather than on earnings. Consequently, 
they have not been as much of a threat to running the firm in the 
interests of employees such as other outside providers of finance 
might represent. 
Within the firm, decision-making power is pushed down the 
managerial hierarchy, often right to the shop floor, where worker 
teams are responsible for determining how they will do the tasks they 
face, where employee suggestions are eagerly sought and acted upon, 
and where an individual has the right and duty to stop the assembly 
line if a problem arises. Despite the existence of a managerial hierar-
chy, communication within the firm is often horizontal, with adapta-
tions to changing circumstances being determined by the affected 
line personnel directly rather than by hierarchic superiors. Corporate 
policy and strategy is formulated at the lowest possible levels and 
then moves up through the hierarchy. It becomes adopted only 
after affected employees have had their say and a "consensus" has 




Clearly, executive incentive plans based on stock-price perfor-
mance, such as have become common in large U.S. firms, are inap-
propriate in such a context. Indeed, instituting them would 
undermine the tendency to run the firm in the employees' interests. 
Employees receive a large percentage of their incomes (25 to 30% 
in normal times) in the form of bonuses that are perceived to be tied 
to the overall performance of the firm. This makes them effectively 
residual claimants as well as residual decision makers, at least in the 
long run. It also facilitates maintaining permanent employment, be-
cause pay can be cut in bad times to reduce labor costs without layoffs. 
It also increases the value of running the firm in the interests of 
the employees, so that they need not fear that the managers, acting 
1
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 Paul Sheard (1994) offers a similar argument regarding complementarity 
among crossshareholding, the employment system and the participatory gover-
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in the interests of outside claimants, will fail to pay the bonuses to 
which the employees are entitled. 
Meanwhile, only a small part of the firm's cash flow has tradition-
ally been paid out to investors as dividends, with the bulk being 
reinvested in the firm. This arguably helps ensure that the firm will 
survive and grow, thereby making the permanent employment 
promise more credible. (A firm run primarily in the interests of 
investors would distribute its earnings back to investors unless its 
internal opportunities for investing these funds carried higher 
returns than were available outside.) More generally, a strategy that 
emphasizes growth and market share rather than profit maximization 
serves very directly to support the permanent employment policy by 
helping ensure that there will be jobs in the future and, beyond that, 
on-going opportunities for promotion. As seen in the recent example 
of IBM in the United States, life-time employment could easily come 
in conflict with strategies aimed at maximizing stockholder returns. 
Corporate strategies accentuating of growth and market share 
have fit well with the external environment in which Japanese 
business has operated. This is more than just a matter of noting 
that growth for an individual firm is easier if the overall economy is 
growing. Japan's high national savings rates combined with govern-
ment restrictions and regulations on financial institutions and finan-
cial markets combined to give large, established Japanese firms a 
lower cost of capital through much of the post-War period than 
prevailed in other countries. This made the gap between growth-
oriented and profit-oriented policies smaller, encouraging high levels 
of investment and the patience to wait for deferred returns to these 
investments. The opportunity to import technologies and to export 
to world markets that were increasingly open to international trade in 
the post-War era also facilitated Japanese growth, both in the ag-
gregate and at the level of the individual large firm. This growth was 
further supported by a widely-shared social goal of rebuilding Japan 
from the wartime destruction and bringing it up to world levels of 
productivity and weaith This encouraged accentuating economic 
growth over current consurnption iLs did a set of social and cultural 
values that honored and rewarded devotion to one's employer. Also 
range of government policies (such as limiting market 
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markets, minimal antitrust enforcement, and maintaining low costs of 
capital) that favored the interests of vested interests generally and 
particularly those of large businesses over current consumer inter-
ests. These in turn were the outcomes of the complex of supportive 
relationships within the "iron triangle" of the Liberal Democratic 
Party, which controlled the government of Japan throughout the 
period, the bureaucrats in the ministries, and big business. 
The Japanese employment and corporate governance system, in 
which employees did not fear for their jobs, expected to share in the 
fortunes of the firm, did not anticipate leaving for another employer, 
and had a say in the directions the firm would take, encouraged both 
employees and the firm to invest heavily in firm-specific human 
capital. This was further encouraged by the low cost of capital. To the 
extent that the employees had to bear the costs of these investments, 
their doing so was further encouraged by the policy at several firms 
of paying blue-collar workers not for the particular jobs to which 
they were currently assigned, but instead for the skills they had 
acquired from a list established by the firm. An analogous pattern 
developed for white-collar workers, who could be promoted to a 
higher level in the "ranking hierarchy" as a reward even though there 
was no position open at the corresponding higher level in the report-
ing hierarchy, so that the job assignment would be unchanged.
1
2 
At the same time, the extensive acquisition of firm-specific 
human capital, the resultant job-related rents, and the associated low 
turnover allow the firm to finance the acquisition of general-purpose 
human capital -human capital that would be valuable to a variety of 
employers. Typically, firms operating in active labor markets are 
reluctant to finance their employees' acquisition of general-purpose 
human capital because the necessity of meeting competitive employ-
ment offers means they cannot expect to recoup the costs of the 
investment. Japanese firms, in contrast can underwrite their 
employees' gaining such capital without fear that the employees will 
use it to obtain offers of higher-paying jobs from other employers. 
This may explain why Japanese firms invest very heavily in formal 
training for blue-collar workers and pay significant numbers of their 
1
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managerial employees to get graduate degrees in business and law at 
the firm's expense (a practice European and North American firms 
rarely follow). Frequently transferring employees across functions is 
another element of this investment activity. 
With high levels of firm-specific human capital, the decisions 
taken by the firm place risks on employees' human assets that are 
comparable to those borne by investors' physical capital. The need to 
protect the value of this human capital then supports having 
employees' interests figure into the firm's decision-making. 
An environment of economic and technological change means 
that a firm's employment needs will be changing too. In this context, 
a guaranty of long-term employment would be tremendously expen-
sive if the firm could not reassign workers to new tasks as the needs 
arose. Thus a system of permanent employment differentially favors 
the sort of flexible work rules for which Japanese firms are known, as 
well as frequent inter-functional and geographic reassignments of 
white-collar workers. Extensive worker training in both general and 
specific skills clearly facilitates these sorts of reassignments. As well, 
a system of company unions (rather than industry-wide ones) sup-
ports flexibility, because the company union can more easily be 
responsive to the individual conditions of the specific firm. 
Within the major Japanese corporations, promotions are con-
strained by seniority. A new white-collar recruit can expect to spend 
at least a decade with the firm before being considered, along with 
the others in the same cohort, for a promotion. Then members of any 
experience cohort are evaluated for further promotions only after 
more senior people have had their chances. Pay, too, is tied to 
seniority, with individual merit or performance pay being less sig-
nificant than in North American firms and with the amounts involved 
being quite small. Also, the differences in pay levels between ranks 
are typically smaller than in European firms, and much smaller than 
in North America. These systems would be infeasible if there were an 
active outside labor market that could bid up the pay of star per-
formers. Thus the promotion and pay policies rely on the practice of 





 This is another instance of a mutually supporting relationship among the 
policies of different organizations -a strategic complementarity. 28 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
The system of decision-making by consensus requires that large 
numbers of individuals have a role in decisions, and that all affected 
parties be allowed to make their views, interests, and concerns known. 




 if pay and promotions were less a matter of seniority, more 
sensitive to apparent qualifications and merit, and more a matter of 
managerial discretion. As well, the policies of promoting growth and 
pursuing market share, even at the possible cost of reduced investor 
returns, help ensure that there will be good opportunities for promo-
tion when the time comes. Such opportunities may possibly reduce 
the competition among workers, limiting influence activities and 
promoting effective consensus decision-making. It is also possible that 
the policy of reinvesting most of the cash flow also limits the competi-
tion among groups and business units within the firm for the resour-
ces needed to develop their projects. If the resources were more 
limited and internal projects had to compete with paying the money 
out to investors, those inside the firm would campaign" much more 
intensely for their interests. The standard policy of moving white-
collar workers around within the corporation, rather than having 
them build their careers in a single function or unit also contributes 
to their taking a broad view of their personal interests that is more in 
line with overall organizational success, and this too helps control 
influence activities Paving bonuses that den end on asrsrresrate 
profitability rather than individual or unit performance has this same 
effect. 
The permanence of employment ensures that employees need 
not fear that attempts to increase efficiency will cost them their jobs, 
while the fact that the firm is run (at least in part) in their interests 
and that their incomes vary with firm performance cause them to 
value efficiency gains positively. Together, these facilitate enlisting 
employees actively in searching for and implementing cost and quality 
improvements and making use of their special local knowledge of 
1
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 Influence activities in firms are the analogue of rent-seeking activities in 
regulated markets. Both are activities aimed at affecting the distributional impact of 
decisions. Such activities are costly both because they dissipate energy and resources 
and because they may result in inefficient decisions. See Milgrom and Roberts, 1990c 
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their jobs. The resultant constant improvement (kaizen) in quality 
tends to increase demand directly, and the improvements in costs are 
complementary with increasing output and sales through price reduc-
tions. Both of these support the growth and market-share strategy. 
They are also, as we have argued in Milgrom and Roberts (1990a), 
complementary with the other aspects of the system that mark 
modern manufacturing: Flexible equipment, reduced time-to-market, 
low inventories, increased communication with suppliers and cus-
tomers, greater reliance on external suppliers rather than complete 
vertical integration, and so on. Of course, several of these features are 
directly complementary with other aspects of the system. For ex-
ample, a permanent employment policy is supported by a policy of 
supplementing internal procurement with outside suppliers from 
which work can be withdrawn in periods of weak demand.
1
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The use of work teams supports both flexibility and the acquisi-
tion of on-the-job training because it allows workers to practice and 
use the multiple skills they develop and it affords experienced workers 
considerable opportunities to participate in training new workers. Or-
ganizing work in teams, however, makes individual performance meas-
urement difficult and so discourages developing significant pay 
differentials among team members. At the same time, if pay were 
allowed to vary more across individuals then the resulting influence 
activities would likely be intense and costly. 
As noted earlier, the promise of permanent employment does not 
extend through to normal retirement age. Large Japanese firms 
impose mandatory retirement at a relatively early age -typically in the 
early to mid-fifties- with only the most senior executives normally 
being exempted. It is, however, standard that those who retire from 
major firms find new jobs to carry them through until they are 
eligible for social security payments at sixty-five. These positions are 
frequently at smaller companies that are connected with the original 
employer (through ownership or long-term commercial relations) 
1
5
 For this to be effective, either the shocks affecting the firm and its suppliers 
must be imperfecdy correlated, or else there must ultimately be firms in the supply 
chain outside the system offering employment guarantees. Thus, it is actually impor-
tant that small and mediumsized firms do not offer promises of permanent employ-
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and that rely on the employer for recommendations. As well, until 
relatively recently vested pensions were a rarity Instead, the firm 
would make a cash payment to the worker at retirement. The practice 
of systematically forcing almost all employees out at a relatively early 
age makes room at the top and, by shortening the period over which 
the commitment is made, makes a permanent employment policy less 
expensive. Beyond this, however, these practices together provide 
potentially important individual performance incentives. 
Lazear (1979) has argued that withholding a portion of earnings 
and then paying them out on successful retirement can be a means 
of implementing a system of bonding by workers and thus can 
deter misbehavior. Moreover, as the managerial hierarchy narrows 
toward the top, the opportunities for promotion worsen. To the 
extent that promotion opportunities are an important motivator, 
some substitute is needed. As well, the reluctance of firms to ter-
minate employees even when they are not performing quite adequate-
ly (because doing so makes it harder to monitor whether the firm is 
keeping the promise of permanent employment) also increases the 
value of some mechanism to provide incentives. The prospects that 
one's performance might influence the assistance one receives from the 
firm in finding a postretirement job (and even, in the case of higher 
level people, the amount of the retirement payment) provide incen-
tives to those who are not going to move higher in the original firm. 
In this system, the demands on the corporation's personnel 
department are quite extensive. With permanent employment, the 
initial selection of suitable recruits for the company is of utmost 
importance, and Japanese firms commonly devote much more time 
to the initial interview and testing stages than the typical North 
American firm. After hiring, the personnel department must be able 
to track employees effectively, to provide appropriate training andjob 
rotations, and to identify and encourage the candidates who are most 
likely to move up into higher management positions.
1
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 This is a 
crucial and complicated task that involves managing an important 
and valuable resource and that hears directly on the welfare of an 
important group of residual claimants. Thus, the personnel function 
1
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is accorded great respect in a major Japanese corporation, and it is 
able to attract among the best employees in the organization. It also 
is typically much more centralized than in North American firms, as is 
consistent with the need to assemble information on any single 
individual from former supervisors in a variety of disparate parts of 
the firm. 
The ownership, financing and governance structure described 
earlier mean that stockholder discipline through proxy contests or 
tender offers is weak in Japan: The market for corporate control is not 
active. Moreover, employee directors are not likely to be the most 
effective monitors or disciplinarians for senior management, at least 
in comparison to outside directors in such U.S. firms as General 
Motors, American Express, IBM and Westinghouse, were the outside 
directors, spurred by investors, all recently removed the CEOs. 
Further, shareholder law suits were not a significant threat under 
the commercial code in effect until 1992, which required a party suing 
a corporation to pay 0.5% of the claimed amount in taxes to file the 
suit. All this increased the value of other sorts of external monitoring. 
This role has been largely filled by the institution of the main bank. 
The bank might play little role in a firm that was doing well, but its 
untensity of scrutiny and involvement could be very great when the 
firm was in serious difficulties (see Aoki, 1992; Aoki and Sheard, 
1992). For example, main banks have replaced senior managers in 
troubled companies. Sumitomo Bank's replacement of the head of 
Mazda in the context of the bank's rescue of the troubled automaker 
shareholder Thus the svstem of monitoring and when necessary 
control by the main bank has been complementary with other aspects 





 Note that the patterns of financing and corporate control practiced in the 
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The long-term relations that exist among Japanese companies 
have frequently been noted, especially in their institutionalized form 
of the keiretsu. These relations are sometimes supported by cross-
ownership of stock, but they also exist even when there is no owner-
ship relation, and they occur both between firms that have frequent 
direct commercial dealings (as in the "vertical" or "production" 
keiretsu involving a manufacturing firm and its suppliers) and among 
firms that transact with each other only on a small scale (as with 
typical members of the "horizontal" keiretsu that are organized around 
a bank or general trading company). The permanent employment 
policy facilitates these relations, because the inter-firm dealings are 
also dealings between specific individuals who stay with their respec-
tive firms for long periods. Significant resources are expended on 
building these inter-personal relations: Major Japanese firms spend 
as much on entertaining managers from other firms as they distribute 
in dividends. Meanwhile, Japanese business people complain that 
building and maintaining a relationship with US firms of the sort they 
enjoy with Japanese ones is hindered by the frequent turnover of 
personnel in the US, which disrupts communication and slows mutual 
learning. 
These long-term relations, which allow the promise of future 
rewards and punishments (both by directly affected parties and by 
others) to control current behavior, permit Japanese industry to 
adopt a relatively low level of vertical integration compared to what 
prevails in the US and Europe while still protecting specific assets and 
allowing close coordination (Asanuma, 1989, 1992). Thus, permanent 
employment and low turnover support the vertical industrial struc-
ture. At the same time, the keiretsu have helped with maintaining 
permanent employment by member firms' supporting other mem-
bers that were in financial difficulties and absorbing employees 
from members that needed to reduce employment (as occurred, for 
example, in the aluminum industry in the wake of the first oil shock 
(Sheard, 1992). 
Transfers of employees seem to be particularly common from ma-
jor firms to subsidiaries and affiliates.
1
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 Sometimes these transfers 
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are temporary and are seen as a means to increase employee human 
capital: Employees learn about another business or acquire 
managerial experience in the related firm. In other cases, they are 
a means to utilize the skills of managers who are not destined to rise 
to higher levels in the core firm, and sometimes they are a means to 
reduce core firm employment without violating the permanent 
employment promise. 
Major Japanese firms in fact typically have relatively large num-
bers of subsidiaries and affiliates, some of which were originally 
created as such and some of which were originally units of the parent 
that have been spun off as separate firms (Itoh, 1993). The creation of 




 First, controlling influence activities in a 
system of consensus decision-making favors having the firm be rela-
tively homogeneous, and separating off businesses that require dif-
ferent employee skill sets or management practices increases 
homogeneity of the core firm. As well, the avoidance of significant 
pay differentials means that divisions of Japanese firms cannot be 
given the independence that they often have in American firms, 
because the senior managers of the divisions cannot be given the 
appropriate performance incentives. Consequently, while Japanese 
firms often have a divisionalized structure on paper, the division 
heads frequently do not have profit and loss responsibility and do not 
have the authority of the corresponding managers in "M-form" or-
ganizations (as described by Oliver Williamson, 1975). Separating the 
division from the core firm by making it a subsidiary or affiliate then 
facilitates performance evaluation and the provision of incentives. As 
well, the relative lack of autonomy of the divisions means that central 
management is frequently making decisions that have potential dis-
tributional effects across divisions. These are an invitation to in-
fluence activities. Separation of a unit as a subsidiary or affiliate is 
then a means for the senior managers of the core firm to commit to 
limited interventions and thus reduces influence activities. 
Thus, many features of the Japanese management system appear 
to be linked by a complex web of complementarities. It is, of course, 
1
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an empirical question whether these links in fact are as we have 
claimed them to be and, if so, how strong the complementarities 
actually are. It is possible, too, that the web of linkages is even richer 
than we have described, with even more strict complementarities 
between pairs, and that it involves even more variables. Skill, assum-
ing that many of the linkages are at least as rich as we have argued, 
the mathematics of complementarity presented in the previous sec-
tion then can give significant insights on a number of issues. 
First, and most obviously, the linkages through complementarity 
of the various features of Japanese economic organization suggest 
that we should often see all these features together: Japanese practices 
on all these various dimensions are not some random selection, but one 
that has a strong internal logic. This is so whether we interpret 
observed practices and patterns as the outcome of a game marked by 
complementarities among the various elements of each player's strategy 
choices and by strategic complementarities among the strategies of 
the different agents, or instead as the result of optimizing in an 
organizational design problem. The pieces of the Japanese pattern fit 
together, supporting one another, with each increasing the effective-
ness of the others. 
Of course, the Japanese system we have described has evolved and 
developed over time; it did not simply emerge full-blown in final 
form. The results cited in the preceding section on dynamics and 
bounded rationality are important in this regard for the plausibility 
of interpreting Japanese economic organization as we have, either 
as the result of a supermodular design problem or as the outcome 
of play of a supermodular game. For they imply that many forms of 
boundedly rational search or play will exhibit momentum: Once the 
system starts moving towards the pattern we have described, it will 
continue to do so, perhaps adding features over time that are com-
plementary with the existing ones. 
We have actually argued that the elements of the Japanese system 
are indecomposably linked: For each of the features listed in Table 1 
there is at least one other that is made strictly more effective by the 
presence of the first, and that feature in turn is linked in turn to others. 
This means that piece-meal adoption of a few of the features of 
Japanese organization in a firm or economy that otherwise is 
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might actually be quite damaging to system performance. If one is 
thinking of adopting some of the elements of Japanese practice, then it 
is important to bring along at least the other major supporting elements. 
The indecomposability also means that a change in certain key 
features of the system -especially features that are strongly connected 
to many others- has the potential to lead to massive systemic change. 
This is so whether the original change is motivated by new constraints 
or by other changes in the environment that directly affect the relative 
payoffs of alternative choices. We will explore the implications of this 
point further in the next section. 
3. Challenges to the Japanese Pattern 
The tightly linked, highly successful system we havejust described and 
analyzed may soon be a thing of the past. A variety of developments 
in Japanese society and politics and in the position of the Japanese 
economy in the world have worsened the fit between the current 
system and its environment and are threatening the continued 
viability of some of the key elements of the current system. If our 
arguments are correct, so that the Japanese system is one in which the 
individual elements are linked by complementarity and form a 
coherent pattern, then these developments that necessitate changes 
in a few of the features of the current organizational arrangements 
may ultimately lead to widespread, systemic changes. In a system of 
complements, altering the values of a few of the variables leads to 
predictable changes in the other variables. In the Japanese context, 
these effects will amount to a fundamental realignment of the pat-
terns of economic organization. 
An appreciation of the need for economic change, and even for 
the possibility that the changes may end up being be fundamental and 
systemic, seems to be developing in Japan. Even before it became clear 
how severe and extended the current recession would prove to be 
discussion had begun about the continued appropriateness or 
viability of some of the characteristic features of Japanese economic 
organization in light of secular trends and developments. 
For example, in 1993 Akio Morita, Chairman of the Sony Cor-
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hours, higher pay, higher dividends, and a greater orientation 
towards profit rather than market share. These changes were seen as 
moves towards doing business as it is done elsewhere in the world. 
They were justified not as necessarily being desirable on their own, but 
instead as being needed if Japan is to be a "good world citizen" whose 
policies and practices were compatible with those of its major trading 
partners. Morita's suggestions apparently did not meet with any wide 
acceptance, but others have echoed similar concerns with the fit 
between Japan and other economies. 
Other business leaders, notably Ken-Ichi Ohmae of McKinsey & 
Company, have pushed for re-orienting Japanese politics and policy 
on purely domestic grounds. The organization founded and led by 
Ohmae, Reform of Heisei, has attracted immense popular attention 
with its call for reforms that would favor consumer interests and those 
of "outsider"-firms (new businesses and foreign firms) that are more 
likely to cater to consumer needs, over those of established big 
business. The stunning defeat of the Liberal Democratic Party, which 
had completely dominated post-War Japanese politics, in the 1993 
election and the formation of the Hosakawa government with its 
promise of electoral and administrative reform and of economic 
deregulation signaled both the Japanese electorate's disgust with the 
prevailing system and their desires for political and economic change. 
The recession that began in 1991 in Japan and that has extended 
into 1994 is intensifying concern with the need for economic change. 
The forces that have created these needs are, however, of longer 
standing. 
We have argued that capital market conditions and practices have 
been key elements in the Japanese model. These are all changing in 
ways that threaten existing organizational patterns. Regulatory chan-
ges have already given rise to vested pension plans and to increased 
competition to invest and manage these. If U.S. experience is any 
guide, this may force the pension fund managers to insist on greater 
profits and payouts from the firms whose stocks they hold, endanger-
ing the policies of retaining the large bulk of corporate earnings and 
of accentuating growth and market share. More generally, on-going 
deregulation of the Japanese financial institutions is opening world 
capital markets to Japanese savers and so raising their required 
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to generate higher returns for investors. Meanwhile, Japanese 
firms (and especially the largest ones and those belonging to 
horizontal keiretsu) have earned returns that matched their low per-
ceived costs of capital and that resulted from their growth-oriented 
policies, but that were well below those generated by corporations 
elsewhere. 
These changes have been going on for some time, but initially the 
pressures for better performance were muted by the huge capital 
gains that resulted from the spectacular run-up of stock and land 
prices in the "Bubble Economy" of the late 1980s. This boom was 
occasioned by the Bank of Japan's keeping interest rates extremely 
low in the face of the huge rise in the value of the yen that followed 
the Plaza Accord. Investor beliefs that these gains would continue to 
mount also kept the perceived cost of capital low, because firms were 
able to issue corporate debt at negligible interest rates by offering 
warrants. For example, Sony financed some of its 1989 acquisition of 
Columbia Pictures, the Hollywood movie studio, with bonds carrying 
warrants. The interest rate on the bonds was less than a third of one 
percent! 
The collapse of stock and real estate prices at the end of the 
"Bubble Economy", however, not only removes the safety valve of 
capital gains, but is likely to intensify the pressure for improved 
financial performance. The decreased asset values have also made it 
more difficult for the banks to finance expansive policies, especially 
because their portfolios contain large amounts of effectively non-per-
forming loans. Stock market prices being at half their peak values 
further contributes to an increased cost of capital and further erodes 
the attractiveness of deferring profits to buy growth in market share. 
The rise in the cost of capital is unlikely to reverse itself. In 
particular, the Japanese population is aging rapidly, and in 1996 14% 
of the population will be over age 65. This represents a doubling in 
only 26 years, and the aging will continue. (In contrast, it took 75 years 
in the U.S. for the percentage of the population over 65 to double from 
7% to 14%, 45 years in the United Kingdom and 115 years in France!) 
Meanwhile, the size of the labor force is projected to peak in the year 
2000, and then to begin to fall. These demographic developments will 
reduce future domestic savings rates and are likely to put further 
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policies more difficult to maintain. This in turn threatens all the other 
features to which they are linked. 
The gradual opening of Japanese product and service markets is 
also threatening established practices. While blue-collar, manufactur-
ing productivity in many Japanese industries is among the highest in 
the world, white-collar productivity is low by international standards, 
especially in services (McKinsey Global Institute, 1992, 1993). The 
extreme manifestation of this are the "window sitters", employees 
who have no work but are simply assigned to sit at their desks by the 
window until they retire. The productivity problems are in part a 
result of the permanent employment policies and the use of promo-
tions as rewards. The former has made shedding unproductive 
workers difficult, and the latter has resulted in excessive numbers of 
employees at high levels. Consensus decision making may have con-
tributed as well: Honda recently shifted away from this approach, 
even though it was one of the cherished values of the firm, because 
its executives believed it rendered decision making too slow and 
unresponsive. The intense hiring by large firms during the "Bubble 
Economy", when capital seemed free and when anticipated future 
labor shortages seemed a pressing concern and the current recession 
have intensified the effects of these long-term trends. As long as 
Japanese markets were relatively closed these inefficiencies could be 
financed by high domestic prices. Markets are firraduallv opening 
however, under the effects of deregulation, the reduction of non-
tariff trade barriers and a breakdown in norms against price com-
petition Competition both from foreign products and firms and 
from new Taoanese entrants is intensifying and increasingly shifting 
towards price competition. For example the US. personal computer 
maker Compaq recently entered the Japanese market at prices that 
were half what the maior Taoanese firms had been charging for similar 
eouioment while a new direct importer of Scotch whisky has so under 
cut the nreviouslv established nrires that dutvfree imnorts of Scotch 
bv Taoanese travellers have fallen 80 nerrent These develonments are 
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permanent employment policy 
Finally, the growth of the Japanese economy is sure to be much 
less in the future than it has been in the past. The Japanese population 
is forecast to stop growing and actually to start shrinking by 2010, with COMPLEMENTARITIES AND SYSTEMS  39 
an increasingly large percentage of the population having retired 
from the work force. Thus, growth in the labor supply will not 
contribute to overall economic growth. Capital deepening is a pos-
sible means of growth, but the rising costs of capital will limit this, 
and, at least for the present, Japanese industry faces massive over-
capacity already. Moreover, Japanese firms are now operating on the 
technological frontier and cannot expect to continue to be significant 
net importers of superior technology, as they once were. All this 
makes it very difficult for the Japanese economy to grow at rates that 
much exceed those of the other advanced economies. 
All these factors make the strategy of running the firm in the 
interests of long-term growth and continuing employment more dif-
ficult to maintain. At the same time, Japanese employees are increas-
ingly willing to change jobs in mid-career. This trend seems to have 
started among managerial employees who had studied abroad and 
who were frustrated by,the slow pace of advancement in their firms. 
They were then recruited by foreign firms seeking Japanese 
managers. It has, however, begun to spread beyond the foreign-
trained and foreign firms. The long-term labor shortages that are 
predicted to follow from the established demographic trends of low 
birth rates and minimal immigration should intensify this trend, as 
should many of the changes in attitudes among younger generations 
towards work and employers that surveys have revealed. Increasingly, 
younger Japanese appear to be unwilling to devote themselves to work 
and to identify their interests with those of their employers to the 
extent that their parents did. Again, if the linkages among aspects of 
Japanese practice are as we have suggested, a breakdown in the 
permanence of employment will require many other fundamental 
changes. 
While these secular developments are going on, the continuing 
recession has put special pressures on Japanese businesses. Under the 
pressure of the recession, with falling sales and profits, firms are 
actively considering ways to increase white-collar productivity, for 
example, by increasing the sensitivity of managerial pay to individual 
performance. Doing so, however, risks undercutting the other aspects 
to which pay policies are linked. Many have even begun to question 
openly the continued viability of permanent employment, and others 
simply state that it is a thing of the past. Already a number of firms 40 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
have not renewed contract workers' employment, and some have 
actually terminated regular employees (usually via pressured early 
retirements, but increasingly through direct layoffs). Even if the 
permanent employment policy is not officially abandoned, these 
forced quits will undermine its credibility. 
With so many of the characteristic features of Japanese economic 
organization being challenged, it is clear that major changes will be 
needed in the economy. Combined with the multiplier effect that 
theory tells us is always associated with systems of complements, we 
are led to expect that the changes will have to be even larger and more 
pervasive than might otherwise appear. 
Perhaps the most interesting question is what new pattern will 
ultimately emerge. In particular, many Japanese are concerned with 
whether their economy must necessarily end up in the American 
mold. Our analysis might suggest this, because parts of the analysis 
were written as if the Japanese and U.S. approaches were the fun-
damental alternatives. But that was merely a convenient assumption. 
Identifying the actual range of alternatives is beyond the scope of our 
analysis or the range of our forecasting powers. 
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